

ENCS5121
Information Security and
Computer Networks Laboratory

EXPERIMENT #3

Padding Oracle Attack

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Overview

- **Objective:** Gain hands-on experience with the Padding Oracle Attack.
- **Scenario:**
 - Systems verify padding in ciphertext and throw errors if invalid.
 - This seemingly harmless behavior enables an attack to uncover secret messages.
- **Lab Setup:**
 - Two oracle servers, each hiding a secret message.
 - Given: Ciphertext and IV (Initialization Vector).
- **Task:** Use oracle's padding validation responses to discover the secret message.
- **Topics Covered:**
 - Secret-key encryption
 - Encryption modes & padding



Outline

- Lab Environment
- Task 1: Getting Familiar with Padding.
- Task 2: Padding Oracle Attack (Level 1).
- Task 3: Padding Oracle Attack (Level 2).

Lab Environment



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Container Setup and Commands

Setup Instructions:

- Download Labsetup.zip to your VM.
 - (https://seedsecuritylabs.org/Labs_20.04/Crypto/Crypto_Padding_Oracle/)
- Unzip and enter the Labsetup folder.
- Use docker-compose.yml to set up the lab environment

```
$ docker-compose build # Build the container images
$ docker-compose up    # Start the containers
$ docker-compose down  # Shut down the containers

// Aliases for the Compose commands above
$ dcbuild # Alias for: docker-compose build
$ dcup    # Alias for: docker-compose up
$ dcdown  # Alias for: docker-compose down
```

Container Setup and Commands (Cont.)

```
$ dockps          // Alias for: docker ps --format "{{.ID}} {{.Names}}"
$ docksh <id>      // Alias for: docker exec -it <id> /bin/bash

// The following example shows how to get a shell inside hostC
$ dockps
b1004832e275    hostA-10.9.0.5
0af4ea7a3e2e    hostB-10.9.0.6
9652715c8e0a    hostC-10.9.0.7

$ docksh 96
root@9652715c8e0a:/#

// Note: If a docker command requires a container ID, you do not need to
//        type the entire ID string. Typing the first few characters will
//        be sufficient, as long as they are unique among all the containers.
```

Task 1: Getting Familiar with Padding



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PKCS#7

- Described in RFC 5652, PKCS #7 works as follows:
 - The value of each added byte is the number of bytes that are added.

With block size = 8 byte = 64 bit

0x A2 CD → 0x A2 CD 06 06 06 06 06 06
 6 padding bytes
 0x A2 CD 03 4D → 0x A2 CD 03 4D 04 04 04 04
 4 padding bytes
 0x A2 CD 03 4D 5F FF → 0x A2 CD 03 4D 5F FF 02 02
 2 padding bytes

With block size = 16 byte = 128 bit

0x A2 CD 03 4D 5F
 ↓
 0x A2 CD 03 4D 5F 0B 0B 0B 0B 0B 0B 0B 0B 0B 0B 0B 0B
 11 padding bytes

Experiment with different file sizes

Steps	Explanation	Command
1	Create files with 5, 10, and 16 bytes	echo -n "12345" > f1.txt # 5 bytes echo -n "1234567890" > f2.txt # 10 bytes echo -n "1234567890123456" > f3.txt # 16 bytes
2	Encrypt the files using AES-128-CBC	openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in f1.txt -out f1.enc openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in f2.txt -out f2.enc openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in f3.txt -out f3.enc
3	Decrypt the files with padding disabled	openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -nopad -in f1.enc -out f1_decrypted.txt openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -nopad -in f2.enc -out f2_decrypted.txt openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -nopad -in f3.enc -out f3_decrypted.txt
4	Display the files in hexadecimal format	xxd f1_decrypted.txt xxd f2_decrypted.txt xxd f3_decrypted.txt

Task 2: Padding Oracle Attack (Level 1)



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The Oracle Setup



```
$ nc 10.9.0.80 5000
```

```
01020304050607080102030405060708a9b2554b0944118061212098f2f238cd779ea0aae3d9d020f3677bfc3cda9ce
```



```
# 96 hex digits (48 bytes)
```

```
# IV (16-byte)
```

```
# C1 (16-byte)
```

```
# C2 (16-byte)
```

```
01020304050607080102030405060708 a9b2554b0944118061212098f2f238cd 779ea0aae3d9d020f3677bfc3cda9ce
```

Useful Notation

Plaintext blocks denoted with P_1, P_2, \dots, P_m .

Ciphertext blocks denoted with C_1, C_2, \dots, C_m .

Where m denotes the total number of blocks.

$P_i^j := j$ -th byte of the i -th plaintext block

$C_i^j := j$ -th byte of the i -th ciphertext block

Let n denote the byte length of the block cipher in use.

$$P_1 := P_1^1, P_1^2, \dots, P_1^n$$

↓

$$C_1 := C_1^1, C_1^2, \dots, C_1^n$$


Useful Notation (Cont.)

Mathematically, let C be the ciphertext of the plaintext P . Then


check if the ciphertext is valid or not

$$O(C) = \begin{cases} 1 & , P \text{ is correctly padded according to PKCS\#7} \\ 0 & , \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


CBC Mode




Green means we know this information




Red means we don't know this information




Blue means information has changed



We don't care about the first block since it does not have any padding



Purple means it is the same before and after our modification



We will find the last byte of P_2 using the **oracle** exposed by the server in a process of **trial and error**.

- Is the last byte of P_2 equal to 0x00?
- Is the last byte of P_2 equal to 0x01?
- ...
- Is the last byte of P_2 equal to 0xFF?

Consider then the following question

Q: Is the last byte of P_2 equal to 0x41?

Using our new notation we can rephrase the question
as follows

Q: $P_2^n = 0x41$?

The idea is to start from C_1 and construct a new \hat{C}_1


$$\hat{C}_1 := C_1^1, C_1^2, C_1^3, \dots, C_1^{n-1}, \underbrace{C_1^n \oplus 0x41 \oplus 0x01}_{\text{byte changed}}$$

Suppose now the attacker sends this new ciphertext \hat{C} to the oracle, and the oracle replies with

$$O(\hat{C}) = 1$$

That is, the associated plaintext \hat{P} is correctly padded according to **PKCS#7**


What can we infer?



Purple means it is the same before and after our modification

In formula,

$$\begin{aligned}
 \hat{P}_2^n &= \hat{C}_1^n \oplus \text{AES-DEC}(K, C_2)^n \\
 &= (C_1^n \oplus 0x41 \oplus 0x01) \oplus \text{AES-DEC}(K, C_2)^n \\
 &= (C_1^n \oplus \text{AES-DEC}(K, C_2)^n) \oplus 0x41 \oplus 0x01 \\
 &= P_2^n \oplus 0x41 \oplus 0x01
 \end{aligned}$$



Therefore,

$$O(\hat{C}) = 1 \implies P_2^n = 0x41 \text{ highly likely}$$

$$O(\hat{C}) = 0 \implies P_2^n \neq 0x41$$

$$Q: P_2^{n-1} = 0x41?$$

The construction of \hat{C}_1 is done as follows

$$\hat{C}_1 := C_1^1, C_1^2, C_1^3, \dots, \underbrace{C_1^{n-1} \oplus 0x41 \oplus 0x02}_{\text{byte changed}}, \underbrace{C_1^n \oplus P_2^n \oplus 0x02}_{\text{byte changed}}$$

$$Q: P_2^{n-2} = 0x41?$$

$$\hat{C}_1 := C_1^1, C_1^2, C_1^3, \dots, \underbrace{C_1^{n-2} \oplus 0x41 \oplus 0x03}_{\text{byte changed}}, \underbrace{C_1^{n-1} \oplus P_2^{n-1} \oplus 0x03}_{\text{byte changed}}, \underbrace{C_1^n \oplus P_2^n \oplus 0x03}_{\text{byte changed}}$$

Padding Oracle Attack Visualization

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uDHo-UAM6_4&ab_channel=PranavJain

<https://paddingoracle.github.io/>



Task 3: Padding Oracle Attack (Level 2)



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First Iteration

$$Q: P_2^n = 0x41?$$

The idea is to start from C_1 and construct a new \hat{C}_1

$$\hat{C}_1 := C_1^1, C_1^2, C_1^3, \dots, C_1^{n-1}, \underbrace{C_1^n \oplus 0x41 \oplus 0x01}_{\text{byte changed}}$$

Found using python code

Assumption

$$\hat{C}_1^n = 0xCF$$

$$\hat{C}_1^n = C_1^n \oplus P_2^n \oplus 0x01$$

$$0xCF = C_1^n \oplus P_2^n \oplus 0x01$$

$$0xCE = C_1^n \oplus P_2^n$$

Given from the server

$$C_1^n = 0xCD$$

$$0xCE = 0xCD \oplus P_2^n$$

$$P_2^n = 0x03$$

Second Iteration

$$Q: P_2^{n-1} = 0x41?$$

The construction of \hat{C}_1 is done as follows

$$\hat{C}_1 := C_1^1, C_1^2, C_1^3, \dots, \underbrace{C_1^{n-1} \oplus 0x41 \oplus 0x02}_{\text{byte changed}}, \underbrace{C_1^n \oplus P_2^n \oplus 0x02}_{\text{byte changed}}$$

From first iteration

From first iteration

$$\hat{C}_1^n = C_1^n \oplus P_2^n \oplus 0x02$$

$$C_1^n = 0xCD$$

$$P_2^n = 0x03$$

$$\hat{C}_1^n = 0xCD \oplus 0x03 \oplus 0x02$$

$$\hat{C}_1^n = 0xCC$$

Found using python code

$$\hat{C}_1^{n-1} = 0x39$$

$$\hat{C}_1^{n-1} = C_1^{n-1} \oplus P_2^{n-1} \oplus 0x02$$

$$0x39 = C_1^{n-1} \oplus P_2^{n-1} \oplus 0x02$$

From the server

$$C_1^{n-1} = 0x38$$

$$0x39 = 0x38 \oplus P_2^{n-1} \oplus 0x02$$

$$P_2^{n-1} = 0x03$$

Third Iteration

$$Q: P_2^{n-2} = 0x41?$$

$$\hat{C}_1 := C_1^1, C_1^2, C_1^3, \dots, \underbrace{C_1^{n-2} \oplus 0x41 \oplus 0x03}_{\text{byte changed}}, \underbrace{C_1^{n-1} \oplus P_2^{n-1} \oplus 0x03}_{\text{byte changed}}, \underbrace{C_1^n \oplus P_2^n \oplus 0x03}_{\text{byte changed}}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \hat{C}_1^n &= C_1^n \oplus P_2^n \oplus 0x03 \\
 \hat{C}_1^n &= 0xCD \oplus 0x03 \oplus 0x03 \\
 \hat{C}_1^n &= 0xCD
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \hat{C}_1^{n-1} &= C_1^{n-1} \oplus P_2^{n-1} \oplus 0x03 \\
 \hat{C}_1^{n-1} &= 0x38 \oplus 0x03 \oplus 0x03 \\
 \hat{C}_1^{n-1} &= 0x38
 \end{aligned}$$

Found using python code

$$\begin{aligned}
 \hat{C}_1^{n-2} &= 0xF2 \\
 \hat{C}_1^{n-2} &= C_1^{n-2} \oplus P_2^{n-2} \oplus 0x03
 \end{aligned}$$

From the server

$$\begin{aligned}
 C_1^{n-2} &= 0xF2 \\
 0xF2 &= 0xF2 \oplus P_2^{n-2} \oplus 0x03 \\
 P_2^{n-2} &= 0x03
 \end{aligned}$$

References

- **SEED LABS .**
- **Some slides are from the following sources:**
 - **Leonardo Tamiano**
 - **(CNS Lab 03 – Padding Oracle On AES-CBC-PKCS#7)**